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A SILK PURSE OR A SOWS EAR?
THE TREATMENT OF EVIDENCE IN THE FRESH,
CHILLED, OR FROZEN PORK FROM CANADA
TRADE DISPUTE
ALAN Rosst

Chapter 19 of the Free Trade Agreement has been generally viewed as a successful mechanism for the resolution of trade disputes between Canada and
the United States. The Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada
dispute, the only case to go before the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
pursuant to article 1904.13 of the FTA, is a notable exception. The Panel's
treatment of evidence deviated from the process for binational panels established under article 1904(3) of the FTA. By failing to adopt a standard of
review required by the law of the importing party, the Panel's reliance on an
independent body of law raised concerns about the procedures offuture bina tional panels under the NAFTA. Changes to dispute resolution under Chapter
19 of the NAFTA have in part vindicated the Pork Panel's decisions.

Le chapitre 19 de !'Entente de Libre Echange est considere comme un mecanisme adequat pour resoudre les litiges entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis a
l'egard des echanges commerciaux. Le litige du "Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen
Pork from Canada," la seule affaire ayant ete devant le Comite Special des
Contestations en vertu de !'article 1904.13 de !'Entente de Libre Echange,
constitue une exception notoire. La consideration des elements de preuve par
le panel devia du processus des tribunaux binationaux etablis en vertu de !'article 1904(3) de !'Entente de Libre Echange. En refusant d'adopter la norme
de controle requise par la loi des parties en presence, la reference par le tribunal a des regles legales independantes souleve des inquietudes au sujet des
procedures des futures tribunaux binationaux sous L 'ALENA. Les changements
apportes au processus de resolution de litige en vertu du chapitre 19 de
L'ALENA ont corrige en parti la decision du tribunal dans l'affaire "Pork."

t IL.

B. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
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Messy and multifaceted, the Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork .from
Canada1 decision has been described as "a landmark determination."2 That case was decided pursuant to Chapter 19 of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)3 which outlines resolution mechanisms for certain types of trade disputes between the two countries. The mechanisms include the use of a panel
comprised of individuals from the United States and Canada to act
as adjudicators of a disagreement. A key issue of contention that
arose from the Pork case was the presiding panel's analysis of the financial injury to the American pork industry caused by American
imports of Canadian pork. The Panel's treatment of evidence,
which arguably affected their final decision, represented a deviation
from the established process for binational panels under Chapter 19.
Accordingly, the Pork experience and a similar contention over
treatment of evidence in the Chapter 19 case of Live Swine From
Canada 4 serve to raise a broader question of how evidentiary procedures operate under the dispute resolution mechanisms of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5
The key points considered in this paper rest upon article 1904
(3) of the FTA:
The panel shall apply the standard of review described in
article 1911 and the general legal principles that a court
of the importing party would apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority. 6

By not adhering to the legal principles that a court of the importing
country would apply in admitted evidence, a panel uses procedure
that is contrary to the provisions of the FTA. Accordingly, the Fresh,
Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada case raises a controversy over
evidence and poses three fundamental questions:
In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (24 August 1990),
USA-89-1904-06 (Memorandum Opinion and Order) [hereinafter Pork].
2 "Canadians win border battle" The Globe and Mail (15 February 1991) BS.
3 The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987, Can. T.S. 1989
No. 3, 27 I.L.M. 281, art. 1806 [hereinafter FTA].
4 In the Matter ofLive Swine from Canada (30 October 1992), USA-91-1904-03
(Decision of the Panel).
1

5 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada,
the Government of the Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of
America (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
6 Supra note 3, art. 1904(3).
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1) If a panel in certain circumstances refuses to consider
evidence presented by a government agency, are they
acting contrary to American law and therefore
contrary to article 1904(3) of the FTA when the
United States is the importing party?
2) If a panel in accepting evidence effectively limits
how a government agency conducts an investigation,
is the panel employing a procedure which is contrary
to American law and therefore contrary to 1904(3) of
the FTA when the United States is the importing
party?
3) If a panel creates and applies independent procedural

law which is not based on the law of an importing
party, is the integrity of the binational panel review
process threatened?
This study traces the development of the pork dispute and of
American law as they relate to these issues, and explores the implications of the NAFTA on similar controversies. To give meaning to
a discussion of the Pork decision, however, it is necessary first to introduce the process of a Chapter 19 dispute and the main facts of
that case.
CHAPTER 19
One of the primary Canadian objectives in negotiating the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement was to create a more
predictable way of dealing with dumping7 and subsidization8 disputes. To this end, in its negotiation of the FTA Canada pursued a
7 Dumping occurs when goods are sold to an importer for less than they are
sold in the country from which they are exported or when goods are sold for
export at prices below their costs of production. If dumping injures producers of
like goods in the importing country, antidumping duties may be imposed by that
country. G. Mcillory, "Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, Dispute
Resolution Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement-The First Year in
Review" (1990), 4 C.U.B.L.R. 190 at190.
B Subsidization occurs when a government provides assistance to stimulate industries, create employment, promote exports or further national objectives. If
subsidized goods are exported and they injure producers of like goods in the
importing country, countervailing duties may be imposed by the importing
country. Ibid
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binding dispute mechanism that would apply a jointly agreed set of
rules on dumping and subsidies. 9 While the parties agreed to continue working for this result under an imposed seven year deadline,10
in the interim a procedural solution was found and enunciated in
Chapter 19. 11
Under Chapter 19 of the FTA, both the United States and
Canada retained the right to apply their own antidumping and
countervailing duty laws to the imports of the other country. 12 The
decisions to apply these laws to imports are undertaken by the
respective national agencies for each country. 13 In Canada, the
Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise determines if dumping and/ or subsidization have occurred, and the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal decides whether there has
been a material injury to an industry. 14 When completed, these
determinations are subject to judicial review 15 at the request of either Canada or the United States 16 by a binational panel 17 of five
persons chosen from candidates selected by each government. 18 This
process replaces domestic judicial review, 19 and does not permit20
judicial review of binational panel decisions. Moreover, it ensures
that panel decisions "shall be binding on the Parties. " 21 For every
9 T. L. McDorman, "The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade
Agreement" (1988), 2 R.I.B.L. 301at318.
10 Supra note 3, arts. 1906 and 1907.
11 This "sunset clause" is not included in the NAFTA.
12 Supra note 3, art. 1902(1).
l3 A. F. Lowenfield, "Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 19 of the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal" (Fall 1991), 24
N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 269 at 271.
14 For the United States, the corresponding agencies are the International
Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) with respect to
dumping and subsidization and the International Trade Commission (ITC) with
respect to injury.
I 5 Generally speaking, judicial review refers to a superior court or legal
body's examination of the conduct of an inferior court, board, committee, or
tribunal, to ensure the conduct was proper in law. John Yogis, Canadian Law
Dictionary 2nd ed. (Toronto: Barron's, 1990) at 120.
l6 Binational panels can also review amendments made to antidumping and
countervailing duty legislation pursuant to FTA article 1903(1).
17 Supra note 3, art. 1904(2).
18 Ibid., Annex 1901.2(1).
19 Ibid., art. 1904(1).
20 ibid., art. 1904( 11).
21 Ibid., art. 1904(9).
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binational panel, each country is to appoint two members. The
chairperson may be a candidate from either country. 2 2 There are
also specific provisions for choosing a fifth panelist. Both a majority of the panelists and the chairperson are required to be
lawyers. 23
While the request for the establishment of a binational panel
must come from the government of either Canada or the United
States, both nations are under an obligation to make a request on
behalf of an individual, who, under domestic law would have been
able to commence judicial review. 24 Accordingly, private parties
with an interest in a trade dispute, such as the exporter or importer
of challenged goods or a domestic competitor, are entitled to
maintain an action for judicial review by a panel, and participate in
the proceedings through independent counsel. 25 The FTA further
stipulates that a request for a binational panel must be made within
30 days of the issuing of a final determination by a national agency
of either the United States or Canada. 26 A failure to make a request
within this period precludes review by a binational panel, but still
allows for domestic judicial review. 27 With respect to remedies,
the decision of a binational panel must be either an upholding of a
governmental agency's final determination, or a referral of that
determination back to the competent authority to take action consistent with the panel's position. 28 A panel may not substitute its
decision for that of the government authority in question. Finally,
once action is taken by a government agency in response to a panel's
recommendations, the panel may review that action.
The FTA stipulates that the procedural laws of the importing
country govern the binational panel review process. 2 9 The AmIbid., Annex 1901.2(2).
Ibid., Annex 1901.2(2) and (4).
24 Ibid., arts. 1904(5) and (15)(b).
25 Supranote3, arts. 1904(7) and (14).
2 6 Supra note 3, art. 1904(4); section 44 of the PTA Implementation Act, S.C.
22

23

1988, c. 65, the Canadian implementing legislation, establishes 25 days
following the final determination as the deadline to approach the Canadian
Trade Secretariat in order to have a panel review either an American or Canadian
decision.
27 Ibid., arts. 1904(4) and (12)(a).
28 Ibid., arts. 1904(8) and 1911.
2 9 Ibid., art. 1904(2) and (3). The definition for standard of review under
article 1911 refers for Canada to s. 28(1) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. Chapter
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erican Statement of Administrative Action that accompanied the

United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
states that "the panels will apply exclusively the national law and
standards of judicial review of the country whose AD [antidumping]
or CVD [countervailing duty] decision is under review." 30 Similarly,
the explanatory notes that preface the Canadian text of the FTA
provide that:
Findings by a panel will be binding on both governments.
Should the panel determine that the law was properly
applied, the matter is closed. If it finds that the administrative authority erred on the basis of the same standards
as would be applied by a domestic court, it can send the
issue back to the administrative authority to correct the
error and initiate a new determination [emphasis
added].3 1
Such stipulations mandate that panelists must not apply different
criteria to their review of agency determinations than would occur
if the review were before a domestic court. In cases where the
United States is the importing party, such as in the Fresh, Chilled or
Frozen Pork ftom Canada case, panels must look to the decisional
law of the Court of International Trade and of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit for the appropriate legal principles.32
In appeals involving final antidumping or countervailing determinations by American agencies, there are two standards of review that would be applied by American courts. Which standard is
used depends upon the nature of the determination at issue. 33 The
first standard of review applies only to a determination of the
United States International Trade Commission whether or not to
initiate a review pursuant to section 751 (b) of the TariffAct of I 930
as amended:

F-7, and with respect to the U.S., to section 516A(b)(i) of the TariffAct o/1930 as
amended, 19 U.S.C. s. 1516a(b)(l).
30 H.R. Doc. No. 216, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. at 258.
3l Supra note 3 at 268.
3 2 See e.g., In the Matter of Replacement Parts for Self Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment from Canada (24 January 1990), USA 89-1904-02
(Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Scope Determination) at 3-5.
33 Supra note 3, art. 1904(3).
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The court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding,
or conclusion found in an action brought under paragraph
(2) of subsection (a) of this section, to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of direction, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.3 4
The second standard of review which applies to other American
final determinations says that:
The court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding,
or conclusion found in an action brought under paragraph
(2) of subsection (a) of this section, to be unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. 35
The legislation makes it clear that the scope of the above standards
of review is not as broad as a trial de novo. 36 Similarly, binational
panels are bound to treat evidence solely in the context of a judicial
review function and require identification of any perceived error in
agency determinations. The matter would be remanded back to the
appropriate authority rather than reweighing evidence as would be
done in a new trial.3 7 Such processes became highly relevant in light
of the factual context of the Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from
Canada case.

THE FACTS OF FRESH, CHILLED, OR
FROZEN PORK FROM CANADA

The case of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada was reviewed
under Chapter 19 of the PTA, beginning in 1990, at the request of
two Canadian meat packers, the Canadian Pork Council, the
Canadian Meat Council and the governments of Alberta and
Quebec. In 1989, the United States International Trade
34 Section

516A (b)(l)(A) of the TariffAct of1930, 19 U.S.C. s. l 5 l 6a (1991) as.
am. Section 40l(c) of the United States-Canada Free Trade Implementation Act,
s.c. 1988, c. 65.
35 Section 516A (b)(l)(B) of the Tarif!Acto/1930, 19 U.S.C. s. 1516a (1991).
3 6 Supra note 7 at 199. A trial de novo has been described as "Strictly ... a new
trial before another tribunal than that which held the first trial, as distinguished
from a rehearing before the same tribunal." R. v. Rice, (1930) 3 D.L.R. 911 at 914
(N.S.S.C.).
37 See e.g. Industrial Fasteners Group, American Importers Assoc. v. United States,
525 F.Supp. 885 at 892-3 (1981).
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Administration (ITA) determined that a number of Canadian agricultural programs gave countervailable subsidies to pork producers, 38 while the International Trade Commission (ITC) found that
the United States pork industry had the potential to be materially
injured. 39 Binational panels were formed to address each finding by
way of review.
The Panel's first review of the ITC's decision on injury, which is
the focus of this paper, investigated the possibility that this finding
resulted from (1) inaccurate data on pork production and consumption, (2) questionable conclusions regarding Canada's likely
future market penetration in Japan, and (3) unsubstantiated assumptions about the supply of Canadian hogs in response to subsidy
programs. 40 A majority of the Commissioners in the ITC decision
predicted that Canada's share of the United States market would
rise to a level that would injure U.S. pork producers, even though it
had been declining. 41 The Panel found that important aspects of
ITC's argument were unsubstantiated and that some of its
predictions regarding Canadian production growth arose from
statistical errors. The case was remanded back to the ITC to review
its findings.
On remand the ITC affirmed its finding of a threat of injury.
The Binational Panel remanded the case a second time, and maintained that the ITC had made a legal error by reopening the administrative record to new evidence without giving notice to interested
parties. 42 Upon this, its third consideration, the ITC reached a
negative determination of threat of injury.43
On March 29, 1991 the United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills formally requested the formation of an Extraordinary

38

In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (28 September

1990), USA 89-1904-06, 12 T.T.R.D. 2299 at 2302.
39 Supra note 1 at 12.
40 Supra note 1 at 16-28.
41 Ibid at 32.

42 In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (22 January

1991), USA-89-1904-11 (Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding ITC's
Determination on Remand) at 19.
43 In the Matter ofFresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (February, 1991),
USITC Inv. No. 701-TA-298, 13 IRTD 1453 at 1465.
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Challenge Committee pursuant to article 1904.13 of the FTA. 44
That article and its Annex provide for the establishment of a three
member committee which is required to decide whether a panelist
has violated rules of conduct or whether a panel as a whole has
committed a serious violation of procedure or a jurisdictional excess. It also decides whether any of these actions have threatened the
integrity of the binational panel review process. 45 In the Pork case,
the Committee concluded that none of the allegations provided the
basis for an extraordinary challenge under FTA article 1904.13 and
that the integrity of the binational process had not been threatened.46
One point of conflict in the Pork case was the sanction of a procedural rule of finality. After a first remand the Panel precluded
further consideration of facts and issues by the determining government agency, which in this case was the International Trade
Commission. Such an action arguably meant that the treatment by
the panel of information received from the ITC differed from the
standard of review in American law, thereby deviating from the
provisions of FTA articles 1904(3) and 1911.
RULE OF FINALITY

In the second panel decision of the Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork
.from Canada case, the Panel determined that the FT A article
1904(8) reference to a "final decision" 47 indicated that a binational
panel was under a duty to "state its views with as much finality as
the case permits." 48 It is submitted that the Panel's application of a
policy of finality in reviewing a determination on remand was not
in accordance with American law, and therefore that the Panel in
Pork exceeded its authority as set out in articles 1904(2) and (3),
which refers to a panel's adherence to the law of an importing country.
According to a number of cases on United States law on antidumping and countervailing duties, there is no limitation on the
44 In the Matter ofFresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (14 June 1991),
ECC-91-1904-01 USA (Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational
Panel Remand Decision II) at 11.
45 Supra note 3, art. 1904.13.
46 Supra note 44 at 24.
47 Supra note 3, art. 1904(8).
48 Supra note 43.
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number of times a reviewing court may remand an agency's final
determination. 49 Courts have established that remand is appropriate
whenever "an agency followed an improper method in making a
determination or where there is a deficit in the agency's findings."50
There has also been judicial support for granting a request for
remand if "it fosters and promotes fundamental fairness."51
Accordingly, it may be argued that American law generally provides for broad scope of an agency's remand proceedings, allowing
it to revisit its original determination in its entirety. Such a breadth
of scope is, by its nature, incongruous with placing limitations on
the number of times a reviewing court may remand a determination
of a government authority. These decisions would further support an
argument against the existence of a rule of finality in United States
antidumping and countervailing duty law, which is underscored by
the general principles of American administrative law.
American case law suggests that reviewing courts are prohibited
from usurping the administrative function of government agencies.5 2
American cases have stated that "an appellate court cannot intrude
upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an
administrative agency."53 Through its desire to present a final
decision, the Panel in Pork limited the number of remands on the
Commission's determination, which in turn directly affected the
investigatory role of the ITC. The "rule of finality" allowed the
Panel to substitute its judgment for that of the ITC on the issues of
import penetration54 and price effects.55

The Usurping of Administrative Functions
In the Pork case, the International Trade Commission found that
there would be an injury to the United States pork industry due to
49 See for example Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
50 Timkin v. United States, 10 C.I.T. 86, 630 F.Supp. 1327 at 1332 (1986).
5l Alhambra Foundry Co. v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 1252 at 1262 (1988).
52 Federal Power Comm'nv. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 at 20 (1952).
53 Securities and Exchange Comm'nv. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 at 88 (1943).
5 4 Import penetration in this case refers to the notion that an increase in
Canadian imports combined with reduced domestic production would result in
the sale of more Canadian pork in the United States.
55 The notion of "price effects" in this case pertains to the belief that the
expansion of Canadian pork supply created by Canadian subsidization would
have a negative effect on overall price levels.
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an increase in Canadian imports and a decline in American production. Commissioner Newquist's data indicated that:
Excess pork production in Canada, the likelihood of
product shifting, and the impending decline in domestic
production, all lead me to reaffirm my earlier finding
that an increase in import penetration is likely. 56

In reviewing this position, the panel countered the Commissioner's

finding of product shifting, 57 removed certain evidence which he
relied on from the administrative record5 8 and, in seeking a final
determination, effectively denied Commissioner Newquist the opportunity to find further evidence to support his argument. This final act is enunciated in the Panel's statement:
Although the Panel questions whether Commissioner
Renquist would come to an affirmative finding of threat
of injury without the support of the product shifting argument, the Panel is moved by the requirements of finality to state its views on two grounds even assuming
them to be advanced as independent of the product shifting hypothesis. 59
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Panel refused to give the
Commission an opportunity to establish that a finding of potential
injury could have been made on grounds other than product shifting.
The Panel then proceeded to address the issue of product shifting
by treating evidence in a manner more consistent with a trial de
novo, than with judicial review. The Panel stated:
[The Panel] is troubled by arguments which seek to show
that Canada's share of the United States pork market,
though at a noninjurious level at the time of the ITC' s
Final Determination, will grow, on the prediction that
U.S. producers' sales will decline and that, even if in absolute volume terms Canadian imports remain unchanged
or even fall, they "may" therefore take an increasing per-

56

Jn the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Inv. No. 701TA-298, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 2268, ECC-4 at 32-33.
57 Supra note 42 at 27-28.
58 Ibid. at 19-21.
59 Ibid. at 35.
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centage share of the market. This rests on no substantial
evidentiary indication.60
Through this declaration, the Panel clearly substituted its own
judgment for that of the Commission, and therefore usurped the
ITC's function as a government authority. In so doing, it violated a
fundamental tenet of United States administrative law.
With respect to American law, section 1581 (c) of the Customs
Courts Act of 198061 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of
International Trade (CIT) to review antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. If the CIT establishes that a government
authority has erred in its final determination, it must remand the
determination for the agency's further review. 62 In the case of Florida
Power and Light Co. v. Lorion, the United States Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he proper course ... is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing
court is not ... empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry
into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry. 63
Further, it would appear that an order of remand is a form of relief
for a complainant. 64 Under the Customs Court Act of 1980, the
Court of International Trade
... may order any other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to
declaratory judgements, orders of remand, injunctions
and writs of mandamus. 65
Clearly then, by virtue of article 1904(2) and (3) the Binational
Panel in Pork was subject to the same guidelines in reviewing a final
agency determination as the CIT-guidelines which it refused to
follow.

60 Supra note 43 at 37.
CustomsCourtsAct, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94Stat. 1727.
PPG Industries Inc. v. United States, 708 F.Supp 1327 at 1329 (1989).
63 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 at 744 (1985).
64 Brief of The National Pork Producers Council et al., before The
Extraordinary Challenge Committee, made pursuant to FTA article 1904.13;
supra, note 44 at 32.
65 28 U.S.C. s. 2643 (c).
6l
62
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Counter-Arguments

The main arguments in the Pork case that attempt to justify the
Panel's actions were based largely on the premise that "although
panels are to apply substantive law as would a domestic court, their
method of operation is also to take into account the FTA's objective
of expeditiousness, rather than indefinite review."66 References
to expediency in articles 1904(4), 1904(6), 1904(14) and
1904(15)(g)(ii) are relied upon. 67 This position can be rebutted,
however, by noting that none of these articles necessitate that a panel
come to its determination after only two reviews. While article
1904(14) does propose a time limit for conducting the initial
review of an agency's final determination, it does not address the
question of a review of an agency's determinations on remand.
Therefore, the notion that the FTA's concern with expediency should
allow panels to preclude multiple remands falls short when the text
of the agreement is scrutinized.
FEDERAL REGISTER

A second issue involving evidence in the Pork case emerged from
the Panel's decision not to accept certain data brought forth on remand from the ITC. The ground for this prohibition was that such
information was not within the scope of that agency's Federal
Register 68 notice. In forming that conclusion, the Panel looked to
the principles of "fair play"6 9 and "due process."70 With respect to
fair play, the Panel decided that if the administrative record were
to be reopened, it would be necessary that the participants be
afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the new matters
considered.7 1 On the topic of due process, the Panel looked to the
expressed incorporation under article 1911 of the FTA of the general
66 Supra note 42 at 50.
67
68

Ibid.
The Federal Register is the United States publication which is the medium
for notifying the public of official agency actions. All regulations must be
published in the Federal Register. See R. D. Fox, and E. Sowanda, eds., The
Federal Register, What it Is, and How to Use It (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1985) at 3.
69 Supra note 42 at 20.
70 Ibid.
7 1 Ibid. at 20-21.
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legal principle of "due process," and affirmed that it was available
to all participants in proceedings subject to FT A review. These
principles were deviations from United States law on the issue in
favour of an unlegislated procedure, contrary to 1904(2) and (3).
After the first Panel remand, the ITC stated that it would reopen the record on which it had based its original decision "on three
narrow aspects," 72 and invited parties to make submissions pursuant
to them. However, the Commission then considered information
which went beyond the points specified in both its notice and the
Panel's Remand Order.73 Partly relying on this information (much
of which was Canadian government statistics), the Commission
upheld its finding of the threat of injury. The consideration of new
material was deemed by the Panel to be unacceptable in light of the
time limit the Commission had to meet. The Panel felt that "a line
must be drawn somewhere," 74 and set a time limit of ninety days to
review a determination on remand. 75 Arguably, by not reviewing the
material, the Panel acted independently of United States law.
American case law has suggested that a government authority has
the jurisdiction on remand to re-open an administrative record. The
United States Supreme Court has reckoned that an agency "should
not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the
admissibility of proof,"76 and that if "new evidence [is] necessary to
discharge [an agency's] duty [that] previously erroneous denial
should not ... bar it from access to the necessary evidence for correct judgment." 77 The Supreme Court has also dictated that government authorities "should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
them to discharge their multitudinous duties." 78 In limiting the
scope of its investigation to data provided in its own Federal
Register notice, the Panel in Pork prevented ITC from fulfilling its
legislative mandate.

72 Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, Inv. No. 701-TA-298 55 Fed.
Reg. 39073 (September 1990) (Notice of Remand).
73 Supra note 13 at 319.
74 Supra note 42 at 7.
75 Supra note 3, art. 1904(8).
76 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 at 44 (1904).
77 Flyv. Heitmeyer, 309 U.S. 146 at 148 (1940) [hereinafter Fly].
78 Federal Broadcasting Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 at
143 (1940).
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Based on the cases of Pottsville and Fly, the Panel in Pork should
not have been able to deny the ITC an opportunity to obtain the
evidence necessary to discharge its duty.7 9 United States case law
has further indicated that courts cannot impose the methods, procedures and time dimension of the needed inquiry so as to "propel
the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively
for the administrative agency." 80 Moreover, investigative responsibilities are unconditionally reactivated on remand. 81 It is therefore evident that United States law prohibits reviewing courts from
imposing requirements not provided for by statute and from interfering with administrative investigations. The limitation on new
evidence placed by the panel in Pork represents such interference.

Fair Play and Due Process
As previously indicated, the Panel based its decision not to accept
certain data from the ITC on the grounds of "fair play" and "due
process." Arguments supporting this position maintain that the Free
Trade Agreement itself compels the parties to honour the notion of
"due process"; 82 article 1904(3) ensures that the Panel apply "general
legal principles that a court of the importing party would apply."
Correspondingly, article 1911 interprets "general legal principles"
to include "principles such as standing, due process, rules of
statutory construction, mootness and exhaustion of administrative
remedies." Reliance on this section is questionable, however,
because the principle of due process in the Pork case "required reference to the judicial precedents of the United States courts construing the United States Constitution." 83 Specifically, the complainants had to be entitled to protection under the United States
Constitution to be guaranteed due process pursuant to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In the wording of these Amendments, the
term "citizen" does not include either corporations or aliens. 84 On
this basis, the complainants in Pork might not be granted the right

7 9 A. Lowenfield, "The Free Trade Agreement Meets its First Challenge:
Dispute Settlement and the Pork Case" (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 597 at 613.
80 Securities and Exchange Comm'nv. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 196 (1947).
81 Supra note 53.
82 Supra note 42 at 39.
83 Supra note 64, Brief of the National Pork Producers Council et al at 40.
84 U.S. Const. amend. 14, 1.
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of due process as they are identities existing outside of the United
States. 8 5
On the issue of "fair play," United States case law requires an
agency in the case of a remand to give timely notice of evidence
upon which it relies to the parties effected by it. 86 Lawyers for the
Government of Canada before the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee maintained that the ITC did not do this with their determinations on remand. Such an argument, however, is inadequate
in light of the fact that what could be deemed to be appropriate
notice was given to the parties. Pursuant to the ITC's notice of remand proceedings, the Canadian complainants submitted additional data to the Commission and were only unable to comment
upon the structuring of available information into graphs. 8 7 Any
questionable disclosure pertained to a lack of opportunity for the
complainants to comment on the format of the data culled by the
ITC, which is a completely different matter from being able to
criticize the data itself. American case law further indicates that the
ITC is not required to hear commentary from the parties before it
on every piece of information gathered in an investigation. 88 It can
therefore be argued that "due process" and "fair play" are unsatisfactory bases for the restriction of re-opening an administrative
record on remand. Based on this and other issues discussed above, it
is argued that the Panel's disposition in the Pork case toward evidence leads it to deviate from the conditions of Section 1904 (2)
and (3) under the FTA. This disposition, it appears, was not a revision of procedure isolated to this one case; it became de facto
precedent, which found favour in the case of Live Swine From
Canada. 89

Live Swine .from Canada
In the Chapter 19 case of Live Swine .from Canada the Binational
Panel required, on its first review, the International Trade Ad85

It should be noted, however, that there is a small body of case law which runs
contrary to this position. See e.g. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, and Plylerv. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
86 Supra note 44 at 37.
87 Supra note 64, Brief of the National Pork Producers Council et al. at 51.
88 Norwegian Nitrogen Companyv. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); see also
Timken Companyv. United States, 699 F. Supp. 300 at 309 (1988).
89 Supra note 4.
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mm1stration and the United States Department of Commerce
("Commerce") to re-examine evidence pertaining to a Tripartite
program "based on evidence in the underlying administrative
record. " 90 In turn, Commerce did not follow this direction and
requested a remand to re-open and add to the administrative record
two documents upon which it relied upon. This request was not
granted by the Panel. As in the Pork decision, the Panel justified its
position on the grounds of expeditiousness, as well as the fact that
American case law existed on both sides of the issue. The Panel
explained that "the need for finality in the panel process requires the
record to be kept dosed." 91 Accordingly, the actions of this Panel
appear to run contrary to United States administrative law.n As
Chairman Belman interpreted the use of finality in this decision:
"one is drawn to the conclusion that the panel ... hobbled
Commerce and denied relief to the petitioners for no good reason."93 It may be further argued that the treatment of evidence in
this case and Pork suggests a trend away from adhering to the law of
the importing country. Unfortunately, such a trend may only serve
to hobble the integrity of the binational panel review process itself.

Integrity of Binational Panels
The decisions of both Pork and Swine reflect a belief among panelists in Chapter 19 cases that they are not bound to follow procedural law "that a court of the importing country would apply."9 4
This idea was implied in the Pork decision by that Panel's statements that "a panel is dearly not on the same footing as the CIT" 95
and that the application of American decisions "should take into
account certain special and distinguishing aspects of the ITC' s authority on a remand determination in an FTA Binational Review."96
Adherence to special procedural law which differs from that of the
court of the importing party sets a dangerous precedent for the
90 In the Matter ofLive Swine From Canada (May 19, 1992), USA-91-1904-03
(Decision of the Panel) at 75.
9I In the Matter ofLive Swine From Canada (October 30 1992), USA-91-190403 (Decision of the Panel ) at 21.
92 Supra note 50.
93 In the Matter ofLive Swine From Canada, (October 30, 1992), USA-91-190403 (dissenting opinion of Murray J. Belman) at 14.
94 Supra note 3, art. 1904(3).
95 Supra note 42 at 6.
96 Supra note 42 at 14.
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integrity of dispute resolutions by binational panels. It may lead to
the Extraordinary Challenge Committee being used by litigants as
a device for repeated appeals on this ground, rather than for its
intended purpose, as a means of protection against gross departures
from fundamental rules of procedure.97
Besides being contrary to the FT A as contemplated by the
United States and Canada, such "special law" could lead to different procedural systems and standards for reviewing antidumping
and countervailing duty decisions, depending upon the case.
Jurisprudence separate from the domestic laws of contracting countries might well be erratic, giving way to self-styled rules of individual panels rather than established case law. Clearly this would
cause evidentiary difficulties for grieving parties engaged in
Chapter 19 dispute resolution. A further concern is that the application of different laws by different panels will mean that some
look to the law of importing countries while others may depend
upon a separate and inconsistent source of law within the FTA. This
could create confusion in the international trading community.
Parties appearing before binational panels could not be certain
which body of procedural law would apply to their antidumping or
countervailing duty action. This question becomes magnified in
light of the free trade agreement with Mexico. The risk is that the
precedent of Pork and Swine may be followed in future dispute
resolution cases under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. Further deviations
from the current standards of review among the three signatories in
favour of an independent source of law within that agreement might
then develop.
NAFTA

The dispute settlement provisions under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA
embody much the same focus as those negotiated under the FTA.
Some changes, however, reinforce the position that a binational
97 Supra note 79 at 620. Consider also the experience of the World Bank
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nations of
Other States, 18 March 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 (in force 14 October 1966). The Convention was undermined by frequent appeals to a procedure for annulment of arbitral awards (art. 52) established as a
safety valve for gross violations of due process. See also W. M. Reisman, "The
Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration" [1989] Duke L.J.
739.
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panel must apply the domestic law of the country whose agency is
being challenged. They are in large measure an attempt to ensure
that Mexico's laws pertaining to trade remedies are compatible
enough with those of Canada and the United States to make a
Chapter 19 mechanism suitable. 98 Accordingly, if binational panels
follow selectively the laws of importing countries as happened in
the Pork and Swine cases, inconsistency, unpredictability, and possibly evidentiary problems will result However, when one focusses
on the points of contention in Pork, and particularly the Panel's
disallowance of data beyond that which was stipulated by the administrative record, such problems may be alleviated through certain terms of the NAFTA.
One relevant new obligation under the NAFTA is article 1907(3)
which details actions "desirable in the administration of antidumping and countervailing duty laws." 99 Examples include "publish[ing]
notice of initiating of investigations" 100 and "provid[ing] disclosure
of relevant information [such as] an explanation of the calculation or
the methodology used to determine the margin of dumping." 101
This provision appears to be an attempt to bring Mexico's
standards of judicial review and administrative procedures into
harmony with those of Canada and the United States thereby
establishing similar notions of "due process" among all three
countries. The restructuring of Mexico's standards of "due process"
is more precisely addressed in Annex 15(d) Schedule B. It should
also be noted that a provision (article 1905) exists to deal with
disputes if a party's domestic law prevents a binational panel from
carrying out its functions.
CONCLUSIONS

In light of the changes to Mexico's trade remedy system under the
NAFTA, the manner in which future binational panels treat evidence
will be exceedingly important. If panelists selectively ignore the
law of the importing country, as this paper establishes that they did
in Pork and Swine, then the potential benefits that Mexico could en98 G. R. Winham, Dispute Settlement in NAFTA and the FTA (Faculty of
Political Science, Dalhousie University, 29 September 1992) [unpublished].
99 Supra note 5 at art. 1907(3).

100
101

Ibid.
Ibid.
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joy through a closer North American trading relationship may be
undermined. In particular, panels could serve to lessen the impact of
provisions which emphasize due process simply by disregarding
them. This potentially has larger political implications because by
ignoring law pertaining to due process, such law may be denied a
chance to be a vehicle for change in Mexican administrative law.
However, if one focusses on the issue of whether evidence beyond the
administrative record can be considered by a panel, then aspects of
Chapter 19 of the new agreement look promising indeed.
Arguably, one of the main problems the Panels in both Pork and
Swine faced were the competing requirements of expediting the
process according to article 1904(8), and the concern for following
U.S. law pursuant to article 1904(2) and (3). In both of these cases,
it appears the Panel acted on the premise that allowing the ITC to
hear and use new information gained through a re-opening of the
administrative records within the established ninety day period was
an impossible task. The decision of the Panels to operate
inconsistently with United States administrative law (and therefore
1904(2) and (3)) represents a balancing of factors and the choice
between the lesser of two evils. Setting aside the ninety day time
limit might well have been a greater transgression in view of both
the mandate of the panelists to be expedient, and the divergence of
case law on issues surrounding the reopening of administrative
records.
New provisions of the NAFTA appear to be not only sensitive to
the difficulties of priorizing FTA requirements chronicled in the
Pork and Swine cases, but also supportive of the approach taken by
the Panels in those cases. The 1907(3) provisions stipulate that the
publication of notices indicating investigations, and the disclosure
of relevant information, is seemingly consistent with the Panel's
position in Pork to encourage due process to be applied to all parties, even if it would not be done under the domestic law of the
importing country. Pursuant to Annex 1904 15(d), Schedule B,
section 12, Mexico will be required to maintain an administrative
record of the proceedings of the investigating agency. They are further held to compile "a detailed statement of reasons and legal
basis concerning final determinations." 102 Most importantly, there is
a stipulation that the final determination "be based solely" 103 on the
102
103

Supra note 5, Annex 1904 l 5(d) Schedule B, 12.
Ibid
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administrative record. Had such a clarification existed under the
FTA, it would have vindicated the Panel's position on extra-record
evidence in Pork. This provision augers well as a prevention against
similar conflicts over extra-record data in future Chapter 19 panel
decisions under the NAFTA.
Despite problems that have emerged with the Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanisms under the FTA, they appear to have
achieved moderate success. As Andreas Lowenfield believes:
All things considered, the unique binational dispute
mechanisms created by the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement have worked extraordinarily well. 104
This achievement has been underscored by the fact that there are no
provisions under the NAFTA which stipulate that the signatories are
to move away from the use of binational panels and work towards
jointly agreed rules on dumping and subsidies as articles 1906 and
1907 of the FTA indicated. It is possible that the impact of the
problems addressed in this paper was limited because of the
context in which they occurred. One may argue also that the
evidentiary issues in Pork and Swine did not threaten the Chapter 19
process because in each case they did not substantially affect the
final determination. Indeed, the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee in Pork found that with regard to the use of a rule of
finality and the refusal to reopen the administrative record by the
presiding panel, "none of the alleged errors materially affected the
panel decision or threaten the integrity of the panel review
process." 105
On the matter of the Swine case, a similar response has come
from one of the members of the panel who felt that final decision
would not have been different had finality not been applied and the
administrative record allowed to be re-opened. 106 The fact that
these decisions may invigorate future panels to ignore provisions of
the NAFTA in favour of their own procedures, even in the name of
expediency, is however, extremely serious. Treatment of evidence
not based on the law of the importing country could undermine the
procedural agenda established under Chapter 19.

105
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It has been argued that the decisions of the Panels in Pork and
Swine with respect to disallowing evidence beyond the administrative record would not transgress panel procedure under the NAFTA,
because of the provisions of 1904 15(d) Schedule B, section 12. In
view of the discussed use of the rule of finality in the Pork and
Swine cases, it may be suggested that the NAFTA should have included a provision explicitly allowing binational panels to limit
the number of times a panel can remand an agency's final
determination. Such a provision would clearly be consistent with
the spirit of other aspects of the NAFTA which emphasize
expediency. It would also be in keeping with the efforts of the
NAFTA to create a harmonious trading scheme between the three
nations.
The decisions of Pork and Swine both reflect a balancing of
competing requirements of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement. In the Pork and Swine cases, the use of finality by panels and their prohibition on opening the administrative record were
inconsistent with American law and therefore did not comply with
article 1904(2) and (3) of the FTA. While these evidentiary issues in
themselves have been partially addressed under the NAFTA, their effect on the sanctity of the future binational panel decisions is difficult to predict. The larger problem which emerges from Pork and
Swine is that they may set a precedent for future binational panels
under the NAFTA to selectively disregard the laws of the importing
party and follow an independent body of law. If history shows this
to be the message inherited from these cases then Shakespeare's
adage that "what's past is only prologue" 107 will carry frightening
overtones with respect to international trade. It will help shape a
hemispheric trading world that looks less like a stage for successful
dispute resolution, and more like a three ring circus, with Canada,
Mexico, and the United States as the main attractions.

107

William Shakespeare, The Tempest, II.ii.261.

